We advance three reasons for preferring the Anglo-Saxon business model above the Rhineland model. First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. Second, giving workers a claim on the surplus of the firm raises the cost of capital for investments in jobs. Third,...

We discuss and apply a new measure of competition: the elasticity of a firm's profits with respect to its cost level. A higher value of this profit elasticity (PE) signals more intense competition. Using firm level data we compare PE with the most popular competition measures such as the price...

The financial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks and has led policy makers to propose regulation of banks' remuneration packages. We explain why poor incentives for traders cannot be fully resolved by only regulating the bank's top executives, and why...

This paper provides an analysis of exclusive contracts between health care providers and insurers in a model where some consumers choose to stay uninsured. In case of a monopoly insurer, exclusion of a provider changes the distribution of consumers who choose not to insure. Although the...

The strategic and welfare implications of group contracts for health insurance are not well understood. We estimate a model to determine which factors explain the price of group contracts. In countries like the US and the Netherlands health insurance is provided by private firms, which can...

In this paper, the authors study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers.<font face="CMR10" size="3"><font face="CMR10" size="3">First, they find that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly...</font></font>

The Profit Elasticity (PE) is a new competition measure introduced in Boone (2008). So far, there was no direct proof that this measure can identify regimes of competition empirically. We focus on this issue using data of Genesove and Mullin (1998), in which different regimes of competition...

This paper compares the welfare effects of three ways in which health care can be organized: no competition (NC), competition for the market (CfM) and competition on the market (CoM) where the payer offers the optimal contract to providers in each case. We show that CfM is optimal if the payer...