We extend the 'no-haggling' result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the class of linear multiproduct monopoly problems when the buyer's valuations are smoothly distributed. In particular we show that there is no loss for the seller in optimizing over mechanisms such that all allocations belong...

We solve for the optimal mechanism for selling two goods when the buyer's demand characteristics are unobservable. In the case of substitutable goods, the seller has an incentive to offer lotteries over goods in order to charge the buyers with large differences in the valuations a higher price...

This paper examines the role of intermediaries in quantity regulation theoretically and presents a data application to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The choice of regulated firms to trade permits through intermediaries or directly at the exchange is discussed. Permit pricing...

This paper investigates the upcoming business model of online streaming services allowing music consumers either to subscribe to a service which provides free-of-charge access to streaming music and which is funded by advertising, or to pay a monthly flat fee in order to get ad-free access to...

This paper investigates the upcoming business model of online streaming services allowing music consumers either to subscribe to a service which provides free-of-charge access to streaming music and which is funded by advertising, or to pay a monthly flat fee in order to get ad-free access to...

We analyze the contracting problem of a principal who faces an agent with private information and cannot commit to not renegotiating a chosen contract. We model this by allowing the principal to propose new contracts any number of times after observing the contract choice of the agent. We...

Procurement regulation aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2017) show that such regulation imposes virtually no restrictions on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule - imitation perfection - that restricts discrimination...

Recent technologies permit matching intermediaries to engage in unprecedented levels of targeting. Yet, regulators fear that the welfare gains of such targeting be hindered by the high degree of price customization practiced by matching intermediaries, whereby prices finely depend on the...

Recent technologies enable matching intermediaries to engage in unprecedented levels of targeting, whereby matches finely depend on the agents' characteristics, but also favor customized (i.e., match-specific) pricing. Yet, novel regulations on the transfer of personal data, as well as a renewed...

We study mediated many-to-many matching in markets in which valuations evolve over time as the result of shocks, learning through experimentation, or a preference for variety. The analysis uncovers the key tradeoffs that platforms face in the design of their matching protocols. It shows that the...