Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to prevent this, but still leaves room for litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party might bring suit. We show that with positive...

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Auswirkung der durch die EU-Verbraucherschutzrichtlinie und die Schuldrechtsreform ausgeweiteten gesetzlichen Gewährleistung theoretisch (anhand eines Signaling-Modells) und empirisch (anhand von Felddaten). Die Signalfunktion vertraglicher Garantiezusagen soll...

Dieser Beitrag behandelt Begriff, Ursachen, Wirkungen sowie Bewertung und mögliche Ausgleichsmaßnahmen gestörter Vertragsparität. Dabei wird auf die ökonomische Verhandlungstheorie und die Theorie der Wettbewerbsmärkte zurückgegriffen. Es werden in der Rechtswissenschaft vorfindbare...

Dieser Beitrag analysiert die geplante und zum Teil schon verwirklichte Reform des Gesetzes über Arbeitnehmererfindungen (ArbEG). Im Mittelpunkt der Analyse stehen die Vergütungen, die Arbeitgeber an einen Mitarbeiter zu zahlen haben, wenn sie dessen Erfindung in Anspruch nehmen. Bisher wurde...

The German law on employees' inventions requires employees to report to their employer any invention made in relation with the work contract. An employer claiming the right to the invention is obliged to pay a compensation to the employee. Up to now, this compensation is a matter of...

Ius Commune describes the spontaneous development of a european contract law by adaptive behavior of contracting parties to competing law systems and their interpretations by jursidiction. The idea of spontaneous law harmonization is appealing, since its result is independent of centraized...

In this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).

We analyze the legal reform concerning employees? inventions in Germany. Using a simple principal-agent model, we derive a unique efficient payment scheme: a bonus which is contingent on the project value. We demonstrate that the old German law creates inefficient incentives. However, the new...

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to be a remedy, but gives scope for another kind of opportunistic behavior which we call litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party...