Showing 1 - 10 of 18
Mit Hilfe eines einfachen Vertrauensspiels wird die Bedeutung des Vertrauens als Verhaltensphänomen in der Ökonomie dargelegt und ein Vertrauenskonzept entwickelt, das dem Umstand eingeschränkt rationalen Verhaltens Rechnung trägt. Es wird gezeigt, daß trotz der Einbettung einer Transaktion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509560
This paper presents a modification of the inspection game: The ?Bayesian Monitoring? model rests on the assumption that judges are interested in enforcing compliant behavior and making correct decisions. They may base their judgements on an informative but imperfect signal which can be generated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509572
The Condorcet jury-theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members may only commit one type of error. In binary decision situations however, two error types may occur, the probability of which is independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509620
Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to prevent this, but still leaves room for litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party might bring suit. We show that with positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509558
We present, for the first time, a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. Recognizing the financing constraints that British cost rules may impose on litigants, these new contractual arrangements combine contingency fees with third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509567
This paper analyzes the impact of FORIS contracts on litigation and settlement decisions using a simple divergent-expectations model. A FORIS contract introduces contingent fee arrangements under the British legal cost allocation rule: the plaintiff pays a percentage of his settlement or trial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509575
Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) is not only a device to reallocate risk, but also to enhance an insured's position in a settlement negotiation. The paper points out that this function of LCI is especially important in cases that have a negative expected value for potential plaintiffs. Hence LCI is of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509588
The paper gives a working definition of "cultural heritage" as collection of tangible objects related to the cultural development of a society that are inherited from past generations and are valued by contemporaries as an expression of this cultural development. The potential benefits and costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509607
The papers show that Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) is a device to enhance potential litigants' bargaining position rather than to re-allocate risk. Being insured decreases the cost an insured party has to bear if settlement negotiations fail and the case goes to trial. This shifts the threat...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509618
The paper shows that Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) is a device to enhance potential litigants? bargaining position rather than to re-allocate risk. Being insured decreases the cost an insured party has to bear if settlement negotiations fail and the case goes to trial. This shifts the threat...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509619