In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these...

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...

We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...

In a dynamic model of assignment problems, small deviations suffice to move between stable outcomes. This result is used to obtain no-selection and almost-no-selection results under the stochastic stability concept for uniform and payoff-dependent errors. There is no-selection of partner or...

The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in...

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. We investigate two new properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents....

We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and Volij (2008). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty) solution concept....

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (2010) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers...

We consider hedonic coalition formation games with variable sets of agents and extend the properties competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity (introduced by Klaus, 2011, for roomate markets) to hedonic coalition formation games. Then, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic...

For marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men find all women acceptable and all women find all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and converse consistency. In a recent paper, Nizamogullari and...