This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries.

We extend Kamlen and Tauman's (1986) analysis of the value of a patent by allowing the inventor to use licencing contracts that specify a fixed fee plus a royalty.

We extend Kamlen and Tauman's (1986) analysis of the value of a patent by allowing the inventor to use licencing contracts that specify a fixed fee plus a royalty.

We estimate firm–level idiosyncratic risk in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Our proxy for risk is the volatility of the portion of growth in sales or TFP which is not explained by either industry– or economy–wide factors, or firm characteristics systematically associated with growth...

We estimate firm-level idiosyncratic risk in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Our proxy for risk is the volatility of the portion of growth in sales or TFP which is not explained by either industry- or economy-wide factors, or firm characteristics systematically associated with growth itself. We...

The Model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost Research Joint Ventures (RJVs).

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that...

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no...