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We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. agents cannot receive subsidies from others.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729796
A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731967
A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617066
We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. agents cannot receive subsidies from others.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617085
A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729546
Did the recent transition to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe consitute revolutions? Here, game theory is used to structure an explanation of institutional change proposed by Harold Innis (1950).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616522
which includes reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) and guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) as … effect of reciprocity in the games we consider. Our bounds suggest the model of reciprocity we consider is not a significant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278173
group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under … fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget …-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933673
In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353335
partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353508