Similar Search Results

Impact of Regulatory Agencies on the Efficiency of Publicly-Owned Utilities

Bernard, Jean-Thomas; Nouhi, Mohamed; Roland, Michel - Département d'Économique, Université Laval - 1999

We compare the economic efficiency of a publicly-owned utility directly controlled by the government with a publicly-owned utility regulated by a public utility commission (PUC). Regulation by a PUC is modelled as a Nash equilibrium of a game between two principals, the government and the PUC,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696397

Seamless Electricity Trade between Canada and US Northeast

Bernard, Jean-Thomas; Clavet, Frederic; Ondo, Jean-Cleophas - Département d'Économique, Université Laval - 2003

We analyse how the wholesale electricity market deregulation could modify exchanges between three Canadian regions … of $397.2 million per year while deregulation adds annual savings of $358.7 million. Canadian regions are the main … deregulation across the border should not significantly decrease prices in the U.S. regions although the latter are becoming more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696409

Seamless Electricity Trade between Canada and US Northeast

Bernard, Jean-Thomas; Clavet, Frederic; Ondo, Jean-Cleophas - Groupe de recherche en économie de l'énergie, de … - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670262

Monotonicity and Bounds for Cost Shares under the Path Serial Rule

Truchon, Michel; Téjédo, Cyril - Département d'Économique, Université Laval - 2002

We pursue the analysis of the Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule by examining how the cost share of an agent varies with respect to its own demand and the one of other agents. We also provide bounds for cost shares under an appropriate assumption on the cost function.<P> On poursuit l'analyse de la...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005510368

Aumann-Shapley Pricing: A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

SPRUMONT, Yves - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2004

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1, ...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1, ..., xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1, ..., pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545601

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

SPRUMONT, Yves - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2004

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545645

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

MOULIN, Hervé; SPRUMONT, Yves. - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2002

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545743

An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2013

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186244

An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927904

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2010

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933673