Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 268
Cover Image
Impact of Regulatory Agencies on the Efficiency of Publicly-Owned Utilities
Bernard, Jean-Thomas; Nouhi, Mohamed; Roland, Michel - Département d'Économique, Université Laval - 1999
We compare the economic efficiency of a publicly-owned utility directly controlled by the government with a publicly-owned utility regulated by a public utility commission (PUC). Regulation by a PUC is modelled as a Nash equilibrium of a game between two principals, the government and the PUC,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696397
Cover Image
Seamless Electricity Trade between Canada and US Northeast
Bernard, Jean-Thomas; Clavet, Frederic; Ondo, Jean-Cleophas - Département d'Économique, Université Laval - 2003
We analyse how the wholesale electricity market deregulation could modify exchanges between three Canadian regions … of $397.2 million per year while deregulation adds annual savings of $358.7 million. Canadian regions are the main … deregulation across the border should not significantly decrease prices in the U.S. regions although the latter are becoming more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696409
Cover Image
Seamless Electricity Trade between Canada and US Northeast
Bernard, Jean-Thomas; Clavet, Frederic; Ondo, Jean-Cleophas - Groupe de recherche en économie de l'énergie, de … - 2003
We analyse how the wholesale electricity market deregulation could modify exchanges between three Canadian regions … of $397.2 million per year while deregulation adds annual savings of $358.7 million. Canadian regions are the main … deregulation across the border should not significantly decrease prices in the U.S. regions although the latter are becoming more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670262
Cover Image
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2010
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933673
Cover Image
(Minimally) 'epsilon'-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2012
We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In “small” economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933680
Cover Image
An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2013
We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927904
Cover Image
Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case
SPRUMONT, Yves - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2004
We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353207
Cover Image
Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, changes in production possibilities, and bargaining solutions
Gugl, Elisabeth; Leroux, Justin - Institut d'Économie Appliquée, HEC Montréal (École … - 2009
We consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents’ utility functions preclude transferable utility (a property we call "Almost TU"). We show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008592376
Cover Image
Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities, and Bargaining Solutions
Gugl, Elisabeth; Leroux, Justin - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2009
Consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents’ utility functions precludes transferable utility (a property we call “Almost TU”). We show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528565
Cover Image
Aumann-Shapley Pricing: A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case
SPRUMONT, Yves - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2004
We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1, ...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1, ..., xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1, ..., pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545601