We instillate rational cognition and learning in "seemingly riskless" choices and judgments. Preferences and possibilities are given in a stochastic sense and based on revisable expectations. The theory predicts experimental preference reversals and passes a sharp econometric test of the status...

We instillate rational cognition and learning in "seemingly riskless" choices and judgments. Preferences and possibilities are given in a stochastic sense and based on revisable expectations. the theory predicts experimental preference reversals and passes a sharp econometric test of the status...

We experimentally disentangle the effect of information dissemination from the effect of the time horizon on the investment behavior of a myopically loss averse investor. Our findings show that varying the information condition only suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis...

We present an experimental study to learn about behavior in bargaining situations under large risks. In order to implement realistic risks involved in the field, we calibrate the experimental parameters from an environment involving substantial variation in profits, the motion picture industry....

Data from a field experiment, conducted within a tree-planting firm, are used to estimate the gain in productivity that is realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages. The experiment provides daily observations on individual worker productivity under both piece rates and...

We introduce a procedure to infer the repeated-game strategies that generate actions in experimental choice data. We apply the technique to set of experiments where human subjects play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The technique suggests that two types of strategies underly the data.

We study the issue of integrating real and financial decisions in a monopoly firm with risk-averse decision-makers. To that end, we combine the decisions of the firm and of the shareholders in a very simple but robust model, with uncertainty in the real market and CARA preferences. We show the...

We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities...

We show how to bound the effect of belief-dependent preferences on choices in sequential two-player games without information about the (higher-order) beliefs of players. The approach can be applied to a class of belief-dependent preferences which includes reciprocity (Dufwenberg and...

We study the informational role of prices. To that end, we consider the framework of a dominant firm with a competitive fringe. When the competitive fringe is large enough, there exists a unique fully revealing equilibrium, in which the price conveys full information about the quality of the...