We analyze the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (the fear of social disapproval or stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not perfectly observable. There may be multiple equilibria within a given...

Dans cet article, nous tentons d’évaluer les effets de la corruption sur la croissance, le bien-être et la pauvreté au Sénégal à l’aide d’un modèle d’équilibre général calculable dynamique. Les résultats de nos simulations montrent qu’une fuite de 10% d’investissements...

I examine the case where fulfillment of a contractual commitment is only imperfectly verifiable and ask whether the court should then "tell the truth" regarding the action in dispute. I show that truth seeking does not maximize the expected surplus from contractual relationships. From the...

We incorporate normative motivations into the economic model of accidents and tort rules. The social norm is that one should avoid harming others and should compensate if nevertheless harm is caused. To some extent, this is internalized through intrinsic moral concerns; moreover, those thought...

I consider the efficiency of liability rules when courts obtain imperfect information about precautionary behavior. I ask what tort rules are consistent with socially efficient precautions, what informational requirements the evidence about the parties' behavior must satisfy, what decision rules...

We argue that the common law standard of proof, given the rules of evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued in the legal literature, but may well be efficient from the standpoint of providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior. By contrast, civil law's higher...

We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision-making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of appropriate incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care, when evidence about care is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is...

We consider situations where legal liability yields insufficient incentives for socially efficient behavior, e.g., individuals who cause harm are not always sued or are unable to pay fully for harm done. Some individuals nevertheless behave efficiently because of intrinsic prosocial concerns....