In this paper, we show that in a dynamic general equilibrium economy, the presence of moral hazard need not induce large cuts in optimal unemployment insurance benefits. We find that it takes a quite large proportion of "shirkers" to bend the generosity of the optimal unemployment insurance...

Although it is intuitive and morally compelling that the worst forms of child labour should be eliminated, banning them in poor countries is unlikely to be welfare improving and can come at the expense of human capital accumulation. We show that the existence of harmful forms of child labour, in...

In this paper we view child labor as a negative externality exerted by some poor countries on richer nations. The practice of child labor can thus be used by the poor to extract some form of compensation over time. We build a two-country growth model with international externality. We then...

We show that coordination failures may be part of an explanation for the demographic differences between rich and poor countries and their differing attitudes towards the use of child labor. Our analysis is carried out within a two-period, general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility,...

In this paper, we show how coordination failures may explain the prevalence of child labor in developing countries. We do so within a simple game-theoretic setup. Child labor arises in our environment because of the lack of a coordination mechanism between parental decisions to invest in the...

Economic fluctuations are much stronger in developing countries than in the United States. Yet, while a large literature debates what constitutes a reasonable estimate of the welfare cost of business cycles in the US, it remains an open question how large that cost is in developing countries....

We model a simple justice system in which a court is mandated by society to assess the guilt and the punishment of an accused. The court takes prison facilities as given and neglects its impact on the cost to society of implementing the sentence. Clearly, the court, in this world, will condemn...

We document the real business cycle properties of foreign aid to poor countries. We show that aid exhibits the following empirical regularities over a twenty-five year period. First, it represents a significant source of income for the recipients. Second, it is very volatile - two to three times...

In this paper, I investigate the sustainability of optimal cooperative policies for the replenishment of a renewable resource shared by two countries. If the development of these nations constitutes a threat to the common stock, under what conditions can a social best (a Pareto optimum) be...

In this paper, we show that in a dynamic general equilibrium economy, the presence of moral hazard need not induce large cuts in optimal unemployment insurance benefits when agents are asked to vote on these benefits. We find that it takes a quite large proportion of "shirkers" to bend the...