The process of globalization causes an increasing intensity of institutional competition, i.e. competition among national suppliers of institutional arrangements for mobile factors. This often leads to the conclusion that the competence of national economic policy actors is decreasing. As a...

The question of a double dividend from revenue-neutral ecological tax reforms (an ecological advantage plus an economic advantage) has recently become a widely discussed topic both in real-world economic policy and in economic theory. The subject has produced many advocates and opponents in the...

Naturally, competition policy is based on competition economics made applicable in terms of law and its enforcement. Within the different branches of competition economics, modern industrial economics, or more precisely game-theoretic oligopoly theory, has become the dominating paradigm both in...

This paper provides a comparative analysis of methods for the empirical ex post evaluation of merger control decisions. It develops a competition-policy oriented framework of assessment criteria for the leading evaluation methods and applies them to structural modeling and simulation,...

Newspapers have experienced declining circulation figures and declining advertising revenues for several years. In particular, declining advertising figures put a threat on newspapers – this is especially severe in the US where 73% of their revenues are generated through advertising. On the...

Newspapers have been experiencing declining circulation figures and diminishing advertising revenues for several years – both effects might pose a threat to the continuing existence of (print) newspapers. In an earlier paper, Lindstädt & Budzinski (2011) argued from a theoretical viewpoint...

The literature identifies a significant drop in merger control enforcement activity on both sides of the Atlantic during the last decade. Furthermore, this drop in enforcement activity is convincingly connected to enforcement problems on the sides of the competition agencies. This paper goes...

Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency ef-fect increases welfare by reducing the costs of production...

We demonstrate that the popular Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF) for the analysis of mergers in oligopolies relies regarding its policy conclusions sensitively on the assumption that rational agents will only propose privately profitable mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external...