The process of globalization causes an increasing intensity of institutional competition, i.e. competition among national suppliers of institutional arrangements for mobile factors. This often leads to the conclusion that the competence of national economic policy actors is decreasing. As a...

The question of a double dividend from revenue-neutral ecological tax reforms (an ecological advantage plus an economic advantage) has recently become a widely discussed topic both in real-world economic policy and in economic theory. The subject has produced many advocates and opponents in the...

The competition rules and policy framework of the European Union represents an important institutional restriction for doing sports business. Driven by the courts, the 2007 overhaul of the approach and methodology has increased the scope of competition policy towards sports associations and...

Despite still being younger than a decade, the theory of multisided markets has offered numerous valuable insights for the analysis of industries in which a supplier serves two distinct customer groups that are indirectly interrelated by externalities. Examples include payment systems, matching...

Wettbewerbspolitik wird innerhalb der Europäischen Union in erster Linie auf zwei vertikal miteinander verbundenen Ebenen betrieben, nämlich der supranationalen Ebene der EU-Institutionen und Organisationen und der nationalen Ebene der mitgliedstaatlichen Institutionen und Organisationen : Auf...

The recent Impala Judgment by the CFI on the Sony/BMG Decision by the Commission represents the most important ruling on collective dominance since Airtours. We review both the Decision and the Judgment and derive implications for the institutional and substantive development of EU Merger...

Die europäische Wettbewerbspolitik durchläuft in den letzten fünf Jahren einen grundlegenden Reformprozess, der mit der Neufassung von Kartellverordnung und Fusionskontrollverordnung begann (2002-2004), sich mit der Verfassung von Leitlinien für horizontale (2004) und nicht-horizontale...

We demonstrate that the popular Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF) for the analysis of mergers in oligopolies relies regarding its policy conclusions sensitively on the assumption that rational agents will only propose privately profitable mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external...

An increasingly important part of contemporary merger control both in the US and the EU is unilateral effects analysis, particularly with regard to oligopolistic mergers. In practice, this requires econometric analyses of past market data and, above all, the construction of simulation models in...