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A Review of the Monitoring of Market Power The Possible Roles of TSOs in Monitoring for Market Power Issues in Congested Transmission Systems
Twomey, P.; Green, R.; Neuhoff, K.; Newbery, D. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2005
The paper surveys the literature and publicly available information on market power monitoring in electricity wholesale markets. After briefly reviewing definitions, strategies and methods of mitigating market power we examine the various methods of detecting market power that have been employed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647499
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Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995-2000
Sweeting, A. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2004
This paper shows that generators exercised increasing market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market in the second half of the 1990s despite declining market concentration. It examines whether this was consistent with static, non-cooperative oligopoly models, which are widely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113735
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Determinants of Investment under Incentive Regulation: The Case of Norwegian Electricity Distribution Networks
Poudineh, R.; Jamasb, T. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2013
under incentive regulation. This study analyses the determinants of investment in Norwegian electricity distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729016
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Regulatory Threat in Vertically Related Markets; The Case of German Electricity
Brunekreeft, G. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2002
contrast to other European member states, there is no ex-ante regulation of network access charges. Instead, network access … relies on industrial self-regulation and ex-post control by the Cartel Office. The paper modifies the concept of regulatory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783729
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‘UK domestic energy contracts, the 28 day rule, and experience in Sweden’
Littlechild, S. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2004
In the UK, domestic customers must be able to terminate energy contracts at 28 days’ notice. This has been seen as a transitional protection for customers and for competition. This paper reviews the arguments for and against the 28 day rule, and examines the extent to which UK suppliers have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783746
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Regulation of transmission expansion in Argentina Part II: Developments since the Fourth Line
Littlechild, S.C.; Skerk, C.J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2004
the regulation of monopoly networks is feasible, and the scope for it may be greater than generally appreciated. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783769
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Competitive Bidding for a Long-term Electricity Distribution Contract
Littlechild, S.C. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2001
Demsetz (1968) advocated competitive bidding as a replacement for natural monopoly regulation. Williamson (1976) and … Goldberg (1976) argued that these problems of natural monopoly regulation are inherent in long-term investment under … uncertainty, and that both long- and short-term franchising contracts may be more problematic than regulation. Williams …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783770
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Regulation of transmission expansion in Argentina Part I: State ownership, reform and the Fourth Line
Littlechild, S.C.; Skerk, C.J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2004
From 1992 to 2002, major expansions of the Argentine electricity transmission sector depended on users proposing, voting and paying for such expansions, which were then put out to competitive tender. Commentators hold this novel policy to have been unsuccessful, mainly on the ground that it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783838
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Should Merchant Transmission Investment be Subject to a Must-offer Provision?
Brunekreeft, G.; Newbery, D. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2005
Merchant electricity transmission investment is a practically relevant example of an unregulated investment with monopoly properties. However, while leaving the investment decision to the market, the regulator may decide to prohibit capacity withholding with a must-offer provision. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783840
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Regulatory Challenges to European Electricity Liberalisation
Newbery, D. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2002
The European Commission proposed to reform the Electricity and Gas Directives to improve access to transmission, increase cross-border capacity, and fully open the electricity and gas markets. The California electricity crisis has weakened support for liberalisation, removed the commitment to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783844