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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation

Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021

In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012550309

Efficiency gains from team-based coordination : large-scale experimental evidence

Feri, Francesco; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sutter, Matthias - 2008 - This version: 25 September 2008

The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision-making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733222

Experimental games on networks: Underpinnings of behavior and equilibrium selection

Charness, Gary; Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354731

Pairwise stable matching in large economies

Greinecker, Michael; Kah, Christopher - 2018

We formulate a general model and stability notion for two-sided pairwise matching problems with individually insignificant agents. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over the characteristics of the populations to be matched. These characteristics can be high-dimensional and need not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011791505

Resource scarcity, spite and cooperation

Prediger, Sebastian; Vollan, Björn; Herrmann, Benedikt - 2013

gains can be realized, but turn to spiteful money burners when there is no scope for efficiency improvements and the risk of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009744188

Co-managing common pool resources : do formal rules have to be adapted to traditional ecological norms

Vollan, Björn; Prediger, Sebastian; Frölich, Markus - 2013

We examine the effectiveness of three democratically chosen rules that alleviate the coordination and cooperation problems inherent in collectively managed common-pool resources. In particular we investigate how rule effectiveness and rule compliance depends on the prevailing local norms and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009764816

Intercultural trust : an experiment in Austria and Japan

Netzer, Robert Jiro; Sutter, Matthias - 2009

We show that the level of trust and reciprocity in an intercultural trust game experiment between Austrian and Japanese subjects differs from the results of an intracultural experiment run in the respective countries among compatriots. Austrian subjects show significantly higher levels of trust...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733213

Efficient coalition-proof full implementation

Safronov, Mikhail - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455985

The contribution of taxes, subsidies and regulations to British electricity decarbonisation

Green, Richard; Staffell, Iain - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013257340

Gossip and the efficiency of interactions

Fehr, Dietmar; Sutter, Matthias - 2016

experiment whether gossip affects the efficiency of human interactions. We let subjects play a trust game. Third parties observe … possibility of gossip is highly efficiency-increasing compared to a situation without any gossip. In two further control … treatments, we show that the mere fact of being observed by third parties cannot explain the efficiency-increasing effect of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420430