In this paper the changes in trade patterns introduced by the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement are examined. Variation in the extent of tariff liberalization under the agreement is used to identify the impact of tariff liberalization on the growth of trade both with member countries and...

We analyze China's tariff rates at WTO accession using a political economy approach. A model drawing on Branstetter and Feenstra (<link/>) is used to derive an optimal tariff rate for each industry. The model predicts that a government would set a high tariff rate if an industry is of large stateowned...

Some supporters of antidumping have argued that this procedure serves as a kind of `safety valve' for protectionist pressure. In this paper, we investigate whether there is empirical evidence that the use of antidumping actions has contributed to ongoing tariff reductions over the period 1988 to...

Trade barriers can cause output to be diverted to other countries and into other products. We study the effect of a voluntary price restraint (VPR) on Mexican tomatoes entering the United States. The diversion caused by the VPR is statistically and economically significant - representing over...

We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government...

Disputes over national product standards are a major source of tension in international trade negotiations. The usual pattern is that exporters challenge new product standards as a `disguised barrier to trade.' The paper develops a two-country political agency model of standard setting. It is...

In this paper strategic R&D policy is analysed, where a firm and a firm compete in a third country with vertically differentiated ( and ) products. If the product market is under price competition, the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government has an incentive to tax (subsidize) its domestic firm's...

We examine whether protectionist trade policies lead to increased bureaucratic corruption. Using multiple measures of corruption and trade policies, we find strong evidence that corruption is significantly higher in countries with protectionist trade policies. These results are robust to...

In this paper the effect of voluntary imports expansions (VIEs) on welfare in a dynamic game is analysed. It is found that (1) there exists a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) and a unique stable steady state; (2) with habit formation in consumption, the welfare and output for each firm are...

In this paper the welfare effects of tariffs and import quotas in the presence of involuntary unemployment are derived and compared. The framework used is the standard model of a competitive small open economy with many goods and factors. Optimum levels of the respective trade policy instruments...