We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government...

Disputes over national product standards are a major source of tension in international trade negotiations. The usual pattern is that exporters challenge new product standards as a `disguised barrier to trade.' The paper develops a two-country political agency model of standard setting. It is...

In this paper strategic R&D policy is analysed, where a firm and a firm compete in a third country with vertically differentiated ( and ) products. If the product market is under price competition, the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government has an incentive to tax (subsidize) its domestic firm's...

We examine whether protectionist trade policies lead to increased bureaucratic corruption. Using multiple measures of corruption and trade policies, we find strong evidence that corruption is significantly higher in countries with protectionist trade policies. These results are robust to...

In this paper the effect of voluntary imports expansions (VIEs) on welfare in a dynamic game is analysed. It is found that (1) there exists a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) and a unique stable steady state; (2) with habit formation in consumption, the welfare and output for each firm are...

In this paper the changes in trade patterns introduced by the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement are examined. Variation in the extent of tariff liberalization under the agreement is used to identify the impact of tariff liberalization on the growth of trade both with member countries and...

In this paper the welfare effects of tariffs and import quotas in the presence of involuntary unemployment are derived and compared. The framework used is the standard model of a competitive small open economy with many goods and factors. Optimum levels of the respective trade policy instruments...

A substantial theoretical literature on trade policy as equilibrium outcomes from cooperative and non-cooperative games has grown recently, but its implications have rarely been subjected to empirical scrutiny. It not only makes predictions about equilibrium levels of protection, but also...

In a two-country Hotelling type duopoly model of price competition, we show that parallel import (PI) policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy. The home firm's profit is higher when it <i>cannot</i> price discriminate internationally if and only if the foreign market is sufficiently...