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Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution

Alger, Ingela - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 2009

altruistic individual is better off materially. Between pairs, individuals in the pair with the highest degree of altruism are … better off materially. I determine the evolutionarily stable degree of altruism, allowing for assortative matching. The … stable degree of altruism is strictly smaller than the degree of assortativity, and it may be negative. It is also increasing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005089374

PRIVATE VERSUS COLLECTIVIZED CHARITY: FURTHER EXPLORATIONS OF THE CROWDING OUT DEBATE

West, Edwin G.; Ferris, J. Stephen - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 1999

Part of Introduction: The question whether society can readily substitute public action for private initiative with respect to public goods is still very much open. Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986, hereafter BBV) and Andreoni (1993) challenge the proposition that government provision "crowds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626996

Family ties, incentives and development: A model of coerced altruism

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 2007

mixture of true and coerced altruism between family members. We model families as pairs of siblings. Each sibling exerts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004961534

Social Welfare and Collective Goods Coercion in Public Economics

Winer, Stanley L.; Tridimas, George; Hettich, Walter - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 2007

This paper develops and expanded framework for social planning in which coercion stemming from the provision of public goods is explicitly acknowledged. Key issues concern the precise definition of coercion, its difference from redistribtion, and its incorporation into social welfare...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004961535

Wage, Structure, Turnover and Working Conditions: A Public Finance Perspective

Warskett, George; Winer, Stanley L. - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 2000

We explore the formation of a wage structure within a competitive firm that provides improved working conditions in order to reduce turnover within its labor force. The competitive firm must raise the funds required to pay for workplace improvements by, in effect, taxing its own employees. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626988

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983

Hotte, Louis; Winer, Stanley L. - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 2000

We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive polical economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influcence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627013