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Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games

Fallucchi, Francesco; Renner, Elke; Sefton, Martin - 2013

deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings, and … additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings raises average expenditures. In stochastic contests information feedback …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392399

Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games

Fallucchi, Francesco; Renner, Elke; Sefton, Martin - 2012

very different effects depending on the contest structure. We observe the highest rent dissipation in stochastic contests … when players only get feedback on own choices and earnings. In these contests aggregate expenditures usually exceed the …. In contrast, in deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392436

Signaling without common prior: An experiment

Drouvelis, Michalis; Müller, Wieland; Possajennikov, Alex - 2009

The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277488

Belief formation in a signalling game without common prior: An experiment

Possajennikov, Alex - 2012

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392407

Through Trial & Error to Collusion

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1998

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that this process converges...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062333

False Reputation in a Society of Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Kalai, Ehud - EconWPA - 1997

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541

Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

Reinforcement learning has proved quite successful in predicting subjects' adjustment behaviour in repeatedly played simple games. However, reinforcement learning does not predict convergence to the efficient cell in the minimal information game of mutual fate control, while earlier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407543

Little Information, Efficiency, and Learning - An Experimental Study

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

Earlier experiments have shown that under little information subjects are hardly able to coordinate even though there are no conflicting interests and subjects are organised in fixed pairs. This is so, even though a simple adjustment process would lead the subjects into the efficient, fair and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407575

" Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' "

Anderlini, Luca; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2001

We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407603

Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Duersch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Joerg; … - EconWPA - 2005

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407609