We analyze organization of auctions and bidding strategies with a unique dataset on Paris auctions between 700s and 800s. Prices reflect the objective features of the paintings and of the sale, and they reveal a substantial death effect, with upward jumps in the years after the death of the...

We derive a New Keynesian Phillips Curve under Calvo staggered pricing and price competition. Firms strategic interactions induce price adjusters to change their prices less when there are more firms that do not adjust. This reduces the slope of the Phillips curve and generates an additional...

We reconsider the New Keynesian model with staggered price setting when each market is characterized by a small number of firms competing in prices à la Bertrand rather than a continuum of isolated monopolists. Price adjusters change their prices less when there are more firms that do not...

Most market structures are neither perfectly or monopolistically competitive: they are characterized by a small number of large firms engaged in strategic interactions in their production and investment decisions. Yet, most of our economic theories are still based on a simplified world where...

We study the art market in the Venetian Republic from 1550 to 1750 analyzing the determinants of the prices (adjusted for the cost of living measured by the cost of wheat) of figurative paintings. Reputation of the painters, size of the paintings and other quantifiable factors affect prices as...

We analyze the evolution of the price of paintings in the XVII century Amsterdam art market to test a hypothesis of endogenous entry: higher probability should attract more entry of painters, which in turn should lead to artistic innovations and more intense competition. We build a price index...