The question to what extent social environment affects how individuals govern their groups, has received no special academic attention, yet. Within the framework of a ten-period public goods experi&ment we analyse how social identity affects subjects ́choice of punishment: They may either...

This article analyzes how the anticipation of peer-punishment affects cooperativeness in the provision of public goods under social identity. For this purpose we conduct one-shot public good games with induced social identity and implement in-group, out-group and random matching protocols. Our...

We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage in a signaling-extended prisoner's dilemma. We identify a new type of evolutionary equilibrium - a transitional equilibrium - which is constituted and stabilized by the dynamic...

The article suggests a new explanation for cooperation in large, unstructured societies that avoids the restrictions required in most previous attempts. Our explanation deals with the role of internalized norms. Even internalized norms, i.e. norms that alter the perceived utility from acting in...

We study the coexistence of strategies in the indirect reciprocity game where agents have access to second-order information. We fully characterize the evolutionary stable equilibria and analyze their comparative statics with respect to the cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two...

We study the coexistence of strategies in the indirect reciprocity game where agents have access to second-order information. We fully characterize the evolutionary stable equilibria and analyze their comparative statics with respect to the cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two...

We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences, and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage in a signaling-extended prisoner's dilemma. We prove the existence of a cooperative equilibrium constituted by a (set of) limit cycle(s) and stabilized by the dynamic...

A lot of economic and social situations can be described as contests in which agents need to distribute scare resources. Individual behavior plays an important role within these situations, while identity strongly impacts on behavior. This paper asks how group identity impacts the provision of a...