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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems

Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - 2014

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315

Characterizing the Core Via K-Core Covers

Sanchez-Rodriguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013

shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038137

A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games : Multipurpose Resource Allocation

Borm, Peter - 2011

This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of maximizing the total joint reward,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128540

On the Core of Routing Games with Revenues

Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza; Borm, Peter; Meertens, Marc; … - 2006

shown that these games have a nonempty core and a complete description of the core is provided …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057889

Characterizations of Network Power Measures

van den Brink, René; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; … - 2005

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325263

Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers

Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326133

Minimal Exact Balancedness

Lohmann, Edwin - 2011

To verify whether a transferable utility game is exact, one has to check a linear inequality for each exact balanced collection of coalitions. This paper studies the structure and properties of the class of exact balanced collections. Comparing the definition of exact balanced collections with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130233

Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games

Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - 2014

merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377244

Decentralization and Mutual Liability Rules

Ketelaars, M.W. - 2020

This paper builds on the recent work of Groote Schaarsberg, Reijnierse and Borm (2018) on mutual liability problems. In essence, a mutual liability problem comprises a financial network in which agents may have both monetary individual assets and mutual liabilities. Here mutual liabilities...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846209

Joint Hub Network Development

Cruijssen, F.; Borm, Peter; Dullaert, Wout; Hamers, Herbert - 2007

This paper introduces a framework for joint hub network development. Building a joint physical hub for transhipment of goods is expensive and therefore involves considerable risks for the cooperating companies. In a practical setting, it is unlikely that an entire network will be built at once....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223600