This paper analyzes the problem of selling a number of indivisible items to a set of unit-demand bidders. An ascending auction mechanism called the Excess Demand Ascending Auction (EDAA) is defined. The main results demonstrate that EDAA terminates in a finite number of iterations and that the...

In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity.While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson [15],...

We establish a discrete multivariate mean value theorem for the class of positive maximum component sign preserving functions. A constructive and combinatorial proof is given based upon a simplicial algorithm and vector labeling. Moreover, we apply this theorem to a discrete nonlinear...

We study an economy where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of buyers who want to buy at most one good. We characterize the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors in such an economy using sets of overdemanded and underdemanded goods. Further, we give characterizations for...

We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are...