Showing 1 - 10 of 29
theoretic perspective. A corresponding preparation sequencing game is defined and the focus is on the core and nucleolus of such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196913
family sequencing game has a non-empty core by showing that a particular marginal vector belongs to the core.Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106485
, it is shown that a decreasing unit price function is a sufficient condition for a non-empty core: the Direct Price … solution is both a core element and a marginal vector. It is seen that the nucleolus of an MCP-game can be derived in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107420
This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games. We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729181
core element. Capital dependent deposit games are also shown to have a core element and even a population monotonic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014050439
of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which it leads to a core element and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012957744
representation we also define a generalized Bird allocation which we show to be in the core of the corresponding appropriate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171035
This paper addresses interactive one-machine sequencing situations in which the costs of processing a job are given by an exponential function of its completion time. The main difference with the standard linear case is that the gain of switching two neighbors in a queue is time-dependent and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112741
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012983828
We consider the problem of computing the influence of a neuronal structure in a brain network. Abraham, Kotter, Krumnack, and Wanke (2006) computed this influence by using the Shapley value of a coalitional game corresponding to a directed network as a rating. Kotter, Reid, Krumnack, Wanke, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012987115