This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games. We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for...

If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...

Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queuing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is...

This paper analyzes cooperative purchasing situations with two suppliers with limited supply capacity. In these capacity restricted cooperative purchasing (CRCP) situations we consider a group of cooperating purchasers for whom it turns out to be optimal as a group to or- der as much as possible...