In this paper we provide some technical results related to the Lorenz dominance, which allow to prove that the allocation obtained by the algorithm in Dutta and Ray (1989), when exists, and the elements of the equal split-off set always Lorenz dominate every allocation in the core of the game

A new solution is presented for transferable utility games with graph communication where the cooperation possibilities are represented by a graph. Players are only able to cooperate and obtain some worth in a coalition if they form a connected set in the given graph. To determine the payoff for...

This paper introduces a new class of interactive cooperative purchasing situations and provides an explicit alternative characterization of the nucleolus of cooperative games, which offers an alternative to Kohlberg (1971). In our cooperative purchasing situation, the unit price of a commodity...

If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...

A Chinese postman (CP) game is induced by a a weighted undirected, connected graph in which the edges are identified as players and a vertex is chosen as post-office location. Granot and Granot (2012) characterized graphs that give rise to CP games that are balanced. This note completes this...

This paper introduces cooperative games arising from multi-depot Chinese postman problems and explores the properties of these games. A multi-depot Chinese postman problem (MDCP) is represented by a connected (di)graph G, a set of k depots that is a subset of the vertices of G, and a...

This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitional structure in which only certain sets of players, including the set of all players, are able to form feasible coalitions. The solution concept takes into account the marginal contribution of players. This...

In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper we...

We report the results of a series of experimental Bertrand duopolies where firms have convex costs. Theoretically, these duopolies are characterized by a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Using a 2x2 design, we analyze price choices in symmetric and asymmetric markets under two information...

This paper defines models of cooperation among players partitioning a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of...