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Existing literature regarding the natural hedge potential that arises from combining liabilities with different sensitivities focuses on the optimal liability mix, but does not address the question whether and how changes in the liability mix can be obtained. In the absence of a well-functioning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974804
The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181798
This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitional structure in which only certain sets of players, including the set of all players, are able to form feasible coalitions. The solution concept takes into account the marginal contribution of players. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013088770
of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which it leads to a core element and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012957744
We introduce a theory on marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with arbitrary coalition … graph and the NT-solution coincides with the average tree solution. We also study core stability of the solutions and show … that both the HS-solution and NT-solution belong to the core under half-space supermodularity, which is a weaker condition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175740
introduced, under which the value is guaranteed to be an element of the core. For games with complete graph communication the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097263
, it is shown that a decreasing unit price function is a sufficient condition for a non-empty core: the Direct Price … solution is both a core element and a marginal vector. It is seen that the nucleolus of an MCP-game can be derived in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107420
If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087342
In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013088777
to the interval core of that game and Lorenz dominates each other interval core element. Consistency properties of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722411