introduced, under which the value is guaranteed to be an element of the core. For games with complete graph communication the …

turns out that in an MCP-game all coalitional values can be determined from the values of two-player coalitions. Moreover …, it is shown that a decreasing unit price function is a sufficient condition for a non-empty core: the Direct Price … solution is both a core element and a marginal vector. It is seen that the nucleolus of an MCP-game can be derived in …

If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted …

certain sets of players, including the set of all players, are able to form feasible coalitions. The solution concept takes …

allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of … the power set of the set of players. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that follow from a …

to the interval core of that game and Lorenz dominates each other interval core element. Consistency properties of the …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which it leads to a core element and …

We introduce a theory on marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with arbitrary coalition … graph and the NT-solution coincides with the average tree solution. We also study core stability of the solutions and show … that both the HS-solution and NT-solution belong to the core under half-space supermodularity, which is a weaker condition …