Existing literature regarding the natural hedge potential that arises from combining liabilities with different sensitivities focuses on the optimal liability mix, but does not address the question whether and how changes in the liability mix can be obtained. In the absence of a well-functioning...

Herings et al. (2008) proposed a solution concept called the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. We provide a characterization of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. The characterization underlines an important difference, in terms of symmetric treatment of...

The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is one of the most prominent one-point solution concepts in cooperative game theory that divides revenues (or cost, power) that can be obtained by cooperation of players in the game. The Shapley value is mathematically characterized by properties that have...

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first...

Using network control structures this paper introduces network communication games as a generalization of vertex games and edge games corresponding to communication situations and studies their decomposition into unanimity games. We obtain a relation between the dividends of the network...

This paper studies egalitarianism in the context of nontransferable utility games by introducing and analyzing the egalitarian value. This new solution concept is based on an egalitarian negotiation procedure in which egalitarian opportunities of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We...

This paper analyzes bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility as a generalization of bankruptcy games with monetary payoffs. Following the game theoretic approach to NTU-bankruptcy problems, we study some appropriate properties and the core of NTU-bankruptcy games. Generalizing the core...

In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the class of Step out -- Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to step in at any position later in the processing order....

A cooperative game with non-transferable utility (NTU-game) consists of a collection of payoff sets for the subsets of a finite set of players, for which it has to be determined how much payoff each player must receive. The core of an NTU-game consists of all payoff vectors that are in the...

We consider the problem of computing the influence of a neuronal structure in a brain network. Abraham, Kotter, Krumnack, and Wanke (2006) computed this influence by using the Shapley value of a coalitional game corresponding to a directed network as a rating. Kotter, Reid, Krumnack, Wanke, and...