In the field of design of computer experiments (DoCE), Latin hypercube designs are frequently used for the approximation and optimization of black-boxes. In certain situations, we need a special type of designs consisting of two separate designs, one being a subset of the other. These nested...

We analyse risk preferences using an experiment with real incentives in a representative sample of 1,422 Dutch respondents. Our econometric model incorporates four structural parameters that vary with observed and unobserved characteristics: Utility curvature, loss aversion, preferences towards...

This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a...

Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a...

Understanding how to sustain cooperation in the climate change global dilemma is crucial to mitigate its harmful consequences. Damages from climate change typically occurs after long delays and can take the form of more frequent realizations of extreme and random events. These features generate...

The realization of large-scale projects such as landfills, power plants, etc. is often hindered by the opposition of the possible host community. I study the case in which the opposition emerges from the mistrust of the host community toward the proposer of the project due to an informational...

We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose between fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We...

Herings et al. (2008) proposed a solution concept called the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. We provide a characterization of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. The characterization underlines an important difference, in terms of symmetric treatment of...

Existing literature regarding the natural hedge potential that arises from combining liabilities with different sensitivities focuses on the optimal liability mix, but does not address the question whether and how changes in the liability mix can be obtained. In the absence of a well-functioning...

The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is one of the most prominent one-point solution concepts in cooperative game theory that divides revenues (or cost, power) that can be obtained by cooperation of players in the game. The Shapley value is mathematically characterized by properties that have...