The problem of how to rationally aggregate probability measures occurs in particular (i) when a group of agents, each holding probabilistic beliefs, needs to rationalise a collective decision on the basis of a single 'aggregate belief system' and (ii) when an individual whose belief system is...

We refine the discretization of G-expectation by Y. Dolinsky, M.Nutz, and M. Soner (Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 122 (2012), 664-675), in order to obtain a discretization of sublinear expectation where the martingale laws are defined on a finite lattice rather than the whole set...

¡os's theorem for (bounded) D-ultrapowers, D being the ultrafilter introduced by Kanovei and Shelah [Journal of Symbolic Logic, 69(1):159-164, 2004], can be established within Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus Countable Choice (ZF+ACw). Thus, the Transfer Principle for both Kanovei and Shelah's...

Amartya Sen (1970) has shown that three natural desiderata for social choice rules are inconsistent: universal domain, respect for unanimity, and respect for some minimal rights - which can be interpreted as either expert rights or liberal rights. Dietrich and List (2008) have generalised this...

This paper builds on a recent proposal for microeconomic foundations for "representative agents". Herzberg [Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 46, no. 6, 1115-1124 (2010)] constructed a representative utility function for infinite-dimensional social decision problems and since the decision...

We prove a lifting theorem, in the sense of Robinsonian nonstandard analysis, for the G-expectation. Herein, we use an existing discretization theorem for the G-expectation by T. Fadina and F. Herzberg (Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers, 503,...