This paper studies the consequences of regulating executive compensation at financial institutions by examining the introduction of the UK Remuneration Code, which aimed to change the decision-making horizon and risk-taking incentives of bank executives. We find that, in line with the intent of...

We construct a novel measure of disclosure choice by firms. Our measure is computed using linguistic analysis of conference calls to identify whether a manager's response to an analyst question is a “non-answer.” Using our measure, about 11% of analyst questions elicit non-answers from...

We use machine learning to assess the predictive ability of over a hundred corporate governance features for firm outcomes. We consider financial-statement restatements, class-action lawsuits, business failures, operating performance, firm value, stock returns, and credit ratings. We discover...

We provide large-sample evidence on whether U.S. publicly traded corporations opportunistically use voluntary disclosures about their commitments to employee diversity. We document significant discrepancies between companies' disclosed commitments and their hiring practices and classify firms...