In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The...

A class of cooperative TU-games arising from shortest path problems is introduced and analyzed. Some conditions under which a shortest path game is balanced are obtained. Also an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value for this class of games is provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin...

This paper deals with bankruptcy problems in which the players have different utility functions defined in terms of the quantity of allocated resources. We tackle this kind of situation by means of a game without transferable utility and provide two characterizations of the CEA-rule in this...

We consider the model of cooperative games in which the agents can restrict the communication, because agents are sometimes divided into subgroups in a natural way, for example by their political affinities or by the companies that employ them. More particularly we focus on cooperative games...

In this note we show that the mathematical tools of cooperative game theory allow a successful approach to the statistical problem of estimating a density function. Specifically, any random sample of an absolutely continuous random variable determines a transferable utility game, the Shapley...

Inventory cost games are introduced in Meca et al. (1999). These games arise when considering the possibility of joint ordering in n-person EOQ inventory situations. Moreover, the SOC-rule is introduced and analysed as a cost allocation rule for this type of situations. In the current paper it...

Kalai and Zemel introduced a class of flow-games showing that these games have a non-empty core and that a minimum cut corresponds to a core allocation.  We consider flow-games with a finite number of players on a network with infinitely many arcs: assuming that the total sum of the capacities...

In this paper we consider a cost allocation problem arising in a consortium for urban solid wastes collection and disposal. A classical allocation rule is the proportional division according to the volume of wastes collected; here we propose a different allocation method, rooted in game theory,...

A class of cooperative games arising from economic and operations research situations in which agents with potential individual possibilities are connected via a hierarchy within an organization is introduced. It is shown that the games in this class form a cone which lies in the intersection of...