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-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals … alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of … weighted neighbour allocations is a generalization of the nucleolus, in the sense that the latter is in this class as the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847491
algorithm for calculating the nucleolus. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2006 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759173
We prove that both the nucleolus and the core-center, i.e., the mass center of the core, of an m-sided Böhm …-Bawerk assignment market can be respectively computed from the nucleolus and the core-center of a convex game defined on the set of m … agents but one need to be taken into account. All these results simplify the computation of the nucleolus and the core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847605
modifications of the Shapley value. We axiomatically characterize these two solutions and study their relation to the strong core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847513
Ausgehend von kontinuierlichen 1-Standortproblemen wird in diesem Paper eine neue Klasse von kostenbasierten TU-Spielen eingeführt. Es werden einige hinreichende Bedingungen präsentiert unter denen ein Spiel in dieser Klasse einen nicht-leeren Kern hat. Weiterhin werden Zuordnungsregeln für...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847578
expression for the nucleolus of these games is provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847522
Various least core concepts including the classical least core of cooperative games are discussed. By a reduction from … spanning tree games. As a consequence, computing the nucleolus, the nucleon and the per-capita nucleolus of minimum cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847966
It is well-known that the prekernel on the class of TU games is uniquely determined by non-emptiness, Pareto efficiency (EFF), covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), the equal treatment property, the reduced game property (RGP), and its converse. We show that the prekernel on the class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847974
order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847541
game with transferable utility. We propose two allocations, and discuss their relation to the core and other well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847553