A Harsanyi payoff vector (see Vasil’ev in Optimizacija Vyp 21:30–35, 1978) of a cooperative game with transferable utilities is obtained by some distribution of the Harsanyi dividends of all coalitions among its members. Examples of Harsanyi payoff vectors are the marginal contribution...

This paper studies information collecting (IC) situations with the help of cooperative game theory. Relations are established between IC situations and IC games on one hand and information sharing (IS) situations and IS games on the other hand. Further, it is shown that IC games are convex...

A class of cooperative games arising from economic and operations research situations in which agents with potential individual possibilities are connected via a hierarchy within an organization is introduced. It is shown that the games in this class form a cone which lies in the intersection of...

In this note we show that the mathematical tools of cooperative game theory allow a successful approach to the statistical problem of estimating a density function. Specifically, any random sample of an absolutely continuous random variable determines a transferable utility game, the Shapley...

In this paper we study situations where asymmetric players have restricted possibilities for communication. Extreme asymmetry results in a hierarchy among the players. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values...

Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions. This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic...

This paper introduces and studies the compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs, that is, for cooperative games where the payoff to a coalition of players is a random variable. This value is a compromise between utopia payoffs and minimal rights and its definition is based on...

In this paper, we propose a new extension of the run-to-the-bank rule for bankruptcy situations to the class of multi-issue allocation situations. We show that this rule always yields a core element and that it satisfies self-duality. We characterise our rule by means of a new consistency...

A class of cooperative TU-games arising from shortest path problems is introduced and analyzed. Some conditions under which a shortest path game is balanced are obtained. Also an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value for this class of games is provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin...

This paper introduces a new class of cooperative games called externality games. In these games each player contributes with their specific endowment and also with their presence to the total worth of the coalition she belongs to. We prove that for these games there exists a unique efficient,...