This report uses a generic two-stage escalation model to ask whether and when limited conflicts can occur. There are two players in the model: Challenger and Defender. Challenger can either initiate a conflict or not. If Challenger initiates, Defender can concede, respond-in-kind, or escalate....

A generic asymmetric two-stage escalation model of incomplete information is used to examine strategic relationships in which one player adopts a defense posture akin to the “Massive Retaliation†policy of the Eisenhower administration that relies only on the threat of escalation to...

The agreement between Egypt and Israel at Camp David in 1978 is used to illustrate how a fair-division procedure called Adjusted Winner (AW), in which two sides allocate 100 points over the issues that divide them, could have been used to reach a settlement. AW satisfies the properties of...

“We discussed what the Soviet reaction would be to any possible move by the United States, what our reaction with them would have to be to that Soviet reaction, and so on, trying to follow each of those roads to their ultimate conclusion.†Theodore C. Sorensen about the deliberations...

Deception, which involves the conscious misrepresentation by Deceiver of his preferences to Deceived in a game of incomplete information, is analyzed in 2 × 2 games in which the preferences of players are strictly ordered. The 78 distinct 2 × 2 games are divided into three mutually exclusive...