This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information … private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through bilateral ….e., as discounting and the fixed cost of search become small, all equilibria of the market game converge to perfectly …

Weitzman's search model requires that, conditional on stopping, the agent only takes boxes which have already been … common in the search and information acquisition literature, boxes are inspected following the same order as inWeitzman …

In a two-sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values -- the values to …