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Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets

Mailath, George J. - 2011

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values -- the values to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122231

Pricing in Matching Markets

Mailath, George J. - 2010

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices - a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148518

Common Learning

Cripps, Martin - 2007

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily across agents. We show that that when each agent's signal space is finite, the agents will commonly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776664

Common Learning

Cripps, Martin - 2006

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily agents. Does it follow that the agents will commonly learn its value, i.e., that the true value of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779487

Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown

Mailath, George J. - 2006

Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unbounded support, and market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We study extreme adverse selection via the limit behavior of a financial market as the support of private information converges to an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779690

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

Mailath, George J. - 2015

We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014265

Matching with Incomplete Information

Liu, Quingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - 2012

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014166273