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Testing for Fictive Learning in Decision-Making Under Uncertainty

Bunn, Oliver - 2013

are lotteries where the relative frequencies of outcomes are not known or may not exist. The trials in each experiment are … process used to generate the relative frequencies of the payoffs of the ambiguous lotteries. In the first experiment, the … ambiguous lotteries. In the second experiment the sample averages do not converge.If we define fictive learning in an experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084883

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Horner, Johannes - 2013

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for Markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types be correlated and values interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071462

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001549

On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities

Meneghel, Idione - 2020

This paper presents new results on the existence of pure-strategy Bayesian equilibria in speciﬁed functional forms. These results broaden the scope of methods developed by Reny (2011) well beyond monotone pure strategies. Applications include natural models of ﬁrst-price and all-pay auctions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839304

Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism

Bergemann, Dirk - 2007

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776491

Information Design : A Unified Perspective

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960064

Information Design : A Unified Perspective

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012962810

Information Design : A Unified Perspective

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012942626

On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities

Meneghel, Idione - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859691

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054088