Similar Search Results

Semiparametric Efficiency in GMM Models of Nonclassical Measurement Errors, Missing Data and Treatment Effects

Chen, Xiaohong - 2008

We study semiparametric efficiency bounds and efficient estimation of parameters defined through general nonlinear, possibly non-smooth and over-identified moment restrictions, where the sampling information consists of a primary sample and an auxiliary sample. The variables of interest in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772497

Identification and Inference of Nonlinear Models Using Two Samples with Aribrary Measurement Errors

Chen, Xiaohong - 2006

This paper considers identification and inference of a general latent nonlinear model using two samples, where a covariate contains arbitrary measurement errors in both samples, and neither sample contains an accurate measurement of the corresponding true variable. The primary sample consists of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779138

Identification of Nonparametric Simultaneous Equations Models with a Residual Index Structure

Berry, Steven - 2015

We present new results on the identifiability of a class of nonseparable nonparametric simultaneous equations models introduced by Matzkin (2008). These models combine exclusion restrictions with a requirement that each structural error enter through a “residual index.” Our identification...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019449

Identification of Nonparametric Simultaneous Equations Models with a Residual Index Structure

Berry, Steven - 2017

We present new identification results for a class of nonseparable nonparametric simultaneous equations models introduced by Matzkin (2008). These models combine traditional exclusion restrictions with a requirement that each structural error enter through a “residual index.” Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965556

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Bergemann, Dirk - 2010

independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time.We analyze the first-price auction … disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In … equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139373

Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auctions

Compiani, Giovanni - 2019

implications for market performance and market design. Yet even for the classic example of an oil lease auction, formal evidence on … the presence and strength of common values has been limited by the problem of auction-level unobserved heterogeneity that … is likely to affect both participation in an auction and bidders' willingness to pay. Here we develop an empirical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012867863

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047743

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over valuations, we characterize the set of possible outcomes that can arise in a Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Next
Last