We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information … over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. This tractable characterization …, extending results in Bergemann and Morris, can be used to address a wide variety of questions linking information with the …

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the information … structure determines aggregate volatility. We show that the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information … joint distributions over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. This tractable …

that hold across all common-prior information structures. The purpose of this letter is to give an informal introduction …