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The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation
Bergemann, Dirk - 2007
We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775991
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2015
We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2015
This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245
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Competition and Public Information : A Note
Bergemann, Dirk - 2020
We study price discrimination in a market in which two firms engage in Bertrand competition. Some consumers are contested by both firms, and other consumers are “captive” to one of the firms. The market can be divided into segments, which have different relative shares of captive and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834256
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Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism
Bergemann, Dirk - 2007
which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776491
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Marshall's Theory of Value and the Strong Law of Demand
Brown, Donald - 2007
We show that all the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in Marshall's theory of value, as presented in Note XXI of the mathematical appendix to his Principles of Economics (1890), derive from the Strong Law of Demand. This is, existence, uniqueness, optimality, global stability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776601
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Information and Interaction
Bergemann, Dirk - 2017
We study a linear interaction model with asymmetric information. We first characterize the linear Bayes Nash … information structure.We use our results in a variety of applications: (i) we study the connections between incomplete information … and strategic interaction, (ii) we explain to what extent payoff environment and information structure of a economy are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955894
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Information and Volatility
Bergemann, Dirk - 2014
In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the information … structure determines aggregate volatility. We show that the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information … joint distributions over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. This tractable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052631