correlation across players. For each information structure, we define a simple learning efficiency index, which only considers the … higher learning efficiency index lead to better equilibrium outcomes, robustly for a rich class of games and objective … functions. We discuss implications of our results for constrained information design in games and for the question when …

from the previous players to fathom the past. Each player is therefore both a receiver of information with respect to his … makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria - ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …

a large negative impact on long-run learning outcomes. We consider a population of agents who obtain information about … information aggregation can be improved by simplifying agents’ learning environment. The key feature behind our findings is that …We exhibit a natural environment, social learning among heterogeneous agents, where even slight misperceptions can have …

We study to what extent information aggregation in social learning environments is robust to slight misperceptions of … others' characteristics (e.g., tastes or risk attitudes). We consider a population of agents who obtain information about the … first main result shows that even arbitrarily small amounts of misperception can generate extreme breakdowns of information …

\tau(M), \pi(M) which represent the "time" required to exchange i for j and the "information" needed to determine the …

, assuming agents know each others' skills (the complete information case), this result holds when any Nash equilibrium selection … is incomplete information, the result is still true but now we must restrict to Nash selections for both prizes. We also …

We propose an incomplete information analogue of rationalizability. An action is said to be belief-free rationalizable …. This solution concept characterizes the implications of equilibrium when a player is known to have some private information … but may have additional information. It thus answers the "informational robustness" question of what can we say about the …