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The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk - 2007

We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775991

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245

Experimental Persuasion

Ball, Ian; Espín-Sánchez, José-Antonio - 2021

We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize optimal persuasion in this baseline regime and in an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215572

Competition and Public Information : A Note

Bergemann, Dirk - 2020

We study price discrimination in a market in which two ﬁrms engage in Bertrand competition. Some consumers are contested by both ﬁrms, and other consumers are “captive” to one of the ﬁrms. The market can be divided into segments, which have diﬀerent relative shares of captive and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834256

Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism

Bergemann, Dirk - 2007

which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776491

Marshall's Theory of Value and the Strong Law of Demand

Brown, Donald - 2007

We show that all the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in Marshall's theory of value, as presented in Note XXI of the mathematical appendix to his Principles of Economics (1890), derive from the Strong Law of Demand. This is, existence, uniqueness, optimality, global stability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776601

Information and Interaction

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

We study a linear interaction model with asymmetric information. We first characterize the linear Bayes Nash … information structure.We use our results in a variety of applications: (i) we study the connections between incomplete information … and strategic interaction, (ii) we explain to what extent payoff environment and information structure of a economy are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955894

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