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Horner, Johannes - 2015

effect on the project's dynamics. Starting from the principal's favorite equilibrium, the optimal contract eventually …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027917

Non-Exclusive Insurance with Free Entry : A Pedagogical Note

Dubey, Pradeep K. - 2019

We consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance but without the exclusivity constraint. It turns out that there always exists a unique equilibrium, in which the reliable and unreliable consumers take out a primary insurance up to its quantity limit, and the unreliable take out further...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892349

Mechanism Design with Limited Information : The Case of Nonlinear Pricing

Bergemann, Dirk - 2010

We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller offers a menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal finite menu for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135503

The Implementation Duality

Nöldeke, Georg - 2018

structure can be used to extend existing results for, and gain new insights into, adverse-selection principal-agent problems and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922807

Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations

Deb, Joyee - 2015

be decoupled from his truth-telling incentives. This makes the optimal static contract inefficient and relational … contracts based on the public signals increase efficiency. In the optimal contract, it may be optimal to ignore signals that are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025571

The Implementation Duality

Nöldeke, Georg - 2017

this structure can be used to extend existing results for, and gain new insights into, adverse-selection principal-agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012944599

The Implementation Duality

Nöldeke, Georg - 2015

We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching … obtain a general existence result for solutions to the principal-agent problem, to show that (just as in the quasilinear case …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026253

A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing

Gerardi, Dino - 2008

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing context. In every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Neither the agent's effort nor the realizations of his signals are observable. First, we assume that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769351

Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives

Albagli, Elias; Hellwig, Christian; Tsyvinski, Aleh - 2011

and its investment decisions leads to a systematic premium in the firm's share price relative to expected dividends. Noisy …'s decisions to their own benefit. The managers take advantage of shareholders by taking excessive investment risks when the market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178735

Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency : Evidence from the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India

Ryan, Nicholas - 2019

Weak contract enforcement may reduce the eﬀiciency of investment in developing countries. I study how contract … contract renegotiation and ﬁnd that the renegotiation of contracts in response to cost shocks is widespread, despite that … contract enforcement. Contract enforcement is found to be pro-competitive. With no renegotiation, equilibrium bids would rise …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012893445