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Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations
Deb, Joyee - 2015
be decoupled from his truth-telling incentives. This makes the optimal static contract inefficient and relational … contracts based on the public signals increase efficiency. In the optimal contract, it may be optimal to ignore signals that are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025571
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The Implementation Duality
Nöldeke, Georg - 2015
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching … obtain a general existence result for solutions to the principal-agent problem, to show that (just as in the quasilinear case …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026253
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Dynamic Moral Hazard Without Commitment
Horner, Johannes - 2015
effect on the project's dynamics. Starting from the principal's favorite equilibrium, the optimal contract eventually …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027917
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Non-Exclusive Insurance with Free Entry : A Pedagogical Note
Dubey, Pradeep K. - 2019
We consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance but without the exclusivity constraint. It turns out that there always exists a unique equilibrium, in which the reliable and unreliable consumers take out a primary insurance up to its quantity limit, and the unreliable take out further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892349
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The Implementation Duality
Nöldeke, Georg - 2017
this structure can be used to extend existing results for, and gain new insights into, adverse-selection principal-agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012944599
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The Implementation Duality
Nöldeke, Georg - 2018
structure can be used to extend existing results for, and gain new insights into, adverse-selection principal-agent problems and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922807
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Mechanism Design with Limited Information : The Case of Nonlinear Pricing
Bergemann, Dirk - 2010
We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller offers a menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal finite menu for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135503
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A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing
Gerardi, Dino - 2008
This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing context. In every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Neither the agent's effort nor the realizations of his signals are observable. First, we assume that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769351
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Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives
Albagli, Elias; Hellwig, Christian; Tsyvinski, Aleh - 2011
and its investment decisions leads to a systematic premium in the firm's share price relative to expected dividends. Noisy …'s decisions to their own benefit. The managers take advantage of shareholders by taking excessive investment risks when the market …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178735
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Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency : Evidence from the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India
Ryan, Nicholas - 2019
Weak contract enforcement may reduce the efficiency of production in developing countries. I study how contract … contract renegotiation and find that the renegotiation of contracts in response to cost shocks is widespread, despite that … contract enforcement. Contract enforcement is found to be pro-competitive. With no renegotiation, equilibrium bids would rise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865559