which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey …

of the winner's lower future bids. This equilibrium is efficient, and all information is eventually revealed. Importantly …

information and then transacts with a Firm that uses this information to take a decision. We determine the equilibrium payoffs … that maximize incentives to acquire information. Our analysis is similar to finding ex ante optimal self …-enforcing contracts since information sharing, outcomes and transfers cannot be contracted upon. We show when and how selling and …

An Agent who owns information that is potentially valuable to a Firm bargains for its sale, without commitment and … the hold-up problem (that the Firm would not pay once it learns the information). An example illustrates how it is optimal … to give away part of the information at the beginning of the bargaining, and sell the remainder in dribs and drabs. The …

We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The … potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its … value to the buyer without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how and …

We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions when the information held by strategic agents is a … utility, given partial and differential information about payoff-relevant states of the world. A counterfactual prediction is … desired about behavior in another strategic setting, under the hypothesis that the distribution of and agents' information …

We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions when the information held by strategic agents is a … utility given partial and differential information about payoff-relevant states of the world. A counterfactual prediction is … desired about behavior in another strategic setting, under the hypothesis that the distribution of and agents' information …

private information. We analyze the fully general and non-parametric model, axiomatically characterizing the implied dynamic … stochastic choice behavior. A key new feature relative to static or i.i.d. versions of the model is that when private information … information of the agent, and hence typically lead to different distributions of current choices. Our axiomatization imposes …