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Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations

Deb, Joyee - 2015

both exert effort and report on his co-worker's performance (as in a team setting), the worker's effort incentives cannot … be decoupled from his truth-telling incentives. This makes the optimal static contract inefficient and relational … contracts based on the public signals increase efficiency. In the optimal contract, it may be optimal to ignore signals that are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025571

Dynamic Moral Hazard Without Commitment

Horner, Johannes - 2015

effect on the project's dynamics. Starting from the principal's favorite equilibrium, the optimal contract eventually …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027917

Mechanism Design with Limited Information : The Case of Nonlinear Pricing

Bergemann, Dirk - 2010

We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller offers a menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal finite menu for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135503

Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision

Ederer, Florian - 2017

It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments in a two-task moral hazard model in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973581

Non-Exclusive Insurance with Free Entry : A Pedagogical Note

Dubey, Pradeep K. - 2019

We consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance but without the exclusivity constraint. It turns out that there always exists a unique equilibrium, in which the reliable and unreliable consumers take out a primary insurance up to its quantity limit, and the unreliable take out further...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892349

The Implementation Duality

Nöldeke, Georg - 2018

Conjugate duality relationships are pervasive in matching and implementation problems and provide much of the structure essential for characterizing stable matches and implementable allocations in models with quasilinear (or transferable) utility. In the absence of quasilinearity, a more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922807

The Implementation Duality

Nöldeke, Georg - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012944599

The Implementation Duality

Nöldeke, Georg - 2015

We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026253

Contracting with Word-of-Mouth Management

Kamada, Yuichiro - 2016

positive externalities of users. We fully characterize the optimal contract scheme and provide other comparative statics. In … particular, we show that offering a free contract is optimal only if the fraction of premium users in the population is small …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986537

Contracting with Word-of-Mouth Management

Kamada, Yuichiro - 2018

a free contract. Current customers' incentives to engage in WoM can aﬀect the contracting problem of a firm in the … adopts. A free contract can incentivize WoM because the higher adoption probability increases the expected externalities that … contract is optimal only if the fraction of premium users in the population is small, which is consistent with the observation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911863