Similar Search Results

Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938545

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. The set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium for some information structure is equal to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686938

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686940

Information and Volatility

Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and common components of the payoff state, and display excess response to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817221

Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

We analyze nonlinear pricing with finite information. A seller offers a menu to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. The menu is limited to offering a finite number of choices representing a finite communication capacity between buyer and seller. We identify necessary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011124281

Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

We analyze a nonlinear pricing model with limited information. Each buyer can purchase a large variety, d, of goods. His preference for each good is represented by a scalar and his preference over d goods is represented by a d-dimensional vector. The type space of each buyer is given by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895638

Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come From?

Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We analyze a class of games with interdependent values and linear best responses. The payoff uncertainty is described … distributions under any multivariate normally distributed signals about the payoff states. We characterize maximum aggregate … volatility for a given distribution of the payoff states. We show that the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895692

Information and the Existence of Stationary Markovian Equilibrium

Karatzas, Ioannis; Shubik, Martin; Sudderth, William D. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2000

We describe conditions for the existence of a stationary Markovian equilibrium when total production or total endowment is a random variable. Apart from regularity assumptions, there are two crucial conditions: (i) low information -- agents are ignorant of both total endowment and their own...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087407

Starting Small and Commitment

Watson, Joel - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1999

I study a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete information. The partners jointly determine the stakes of their relationship and individually decide whether to cooperate with or betray each other over time. I characterize the extremal -- interim incentive efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762785

Collaborating

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000297