Showing 1 - 9 of 9
We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism for repeatedly selling a non-durable good in continuous time. The valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes his initial type which influences the evolution of his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933107
theory. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, we show that equilibrium always … for better risk spreading. We also show that default opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087374
In our previous paper we built a general equilibrium model of default and punishment in which equilibrium always exists and endogenously determines asset promises, penalties, and sales constraints. In this paper we interpret the endogenous sales constraints as equilibrium signals. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463898
equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463908
We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In equilibrium, pools with lower quantity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593561
We build a model of competitive pooling and show how insurance contracts emerge in equilibrium, designed by the invisible hand of perfect competition. When pools are exclusive, we obtain a unique separating equilibrium. When pools are not exclusive but seniority is recognized, we obtain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593621
We characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanism for time separable allocation problems in continuous time. The valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes his initial type which influences the evolution of his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011124283
We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In equilibrium, pools with lower quantity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990814
We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism for repeatedly selling a non-durable good in continuous time. The valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes his initial type which influences the evolution of his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895641