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Starting Small and Commitment
Watson, Joel - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1999
I study a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete information. The partners jointly determine the stakes of their relationship and individually decide whether to cooperate with or betray each other over time. I characterize the extremal -- interim incentive efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762785
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Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride
Dubey, Pradeep K.; Geanakoplos, John; Haimanko, Ori - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005
We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages when there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762713
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Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride
Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John; Haimanko, Ori - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371331
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Exact Distribution Theory in Structural Estimation with an Identity
Phillips, Peter C.B. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007
Bergstrom (1962). General IV exact distribution formulae for a structural equation model without an identity are shown to apply … also to models with an identity by specializing along a certain asymptotic parameter sequence. Some of the new exact …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463867
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Toward An Economic Theory of Dysfunctional Identity
Fang, Hanming; Loury, Glenn C. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004
We advance a novel choice-theoretic model of "identity" based on the notions of categories and narratives. Identity is … conceived as a matter of "reflexive perception" -- how people understand themselves. Choosing an identity is equivalent to … common choice in this regard, they embrace a collective identity which is dysfunctional if it is Pareto dominated by an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593463
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A Remark on Bimodality and Weak Instrumentation in Structural Equation Estimation
Phillips, Peter C. B. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005
In a simple model composed of a structural equation and identity, the finite sample distribution of the IV … energy that feeds the secondary mode and the coefficient in the structural identity provides a point of compression in the … more resistant to the attractive effect of the identity than OLS. Some of these limit results differ from conventional weak …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593466
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The Present and Future of Game Theory
Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009204991
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Perfectly Fair Allocations with Indivisibilities
Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
One set of n objects of type I, another set of n objects of type II, and an amount M of money is to be completely allocated among n agents in such a way that each agent gets one object of each type with some amount of money. We propose a new solution concept to this problem called a perfectly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087375
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On Fair Allocations and Indivisibilities
Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
This paper studies the problem of how to distribute a set of indivisible objects with an amount M of money among a number of agents in a fair way. We allow any number of agents and objects. Objects can be desirable or undesirable and the amount of money can be negative as well. In case M is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093928
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An Optimal Fair Job Assignment Problem
Yang, Zaifu - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2002
We study the problem of how to allocate a set of indivisible objects like jobs or houses and an amount of money among a group of people as fairly and as efficiently as possible. A particular constraint for such an allocation is that every person should be assigned with the same number of objects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593278