Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unbounded support, and market breakdown occurs when no … the support of private information converges to an unbounded support. A necessary and sufficient condition for market …

’ private information to others. It is known that markets populated by asymmetrically-informed profit-motivated human traders …

equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately revealing and the incentives to acquire information are preserved …. Price-cost margins and bid shading are affected by the parameters of the information structure: supply functions are steeper … common value case they tend to the collusive level. Private information coupled with strategic behavior induces additional …

We analyze price transparency in a dynamic market with private information and correlated values. Uninformed buyers …

Do asset prices aggregate investors’ private information about the ability of financial analysts? We show that as … financial analysts become reputable, the market can get trapped: Investors optimally choose to ignore their private information …

’ private information to others. Markets populated by human agents are known to be capable of converging to rational …

bounds for both covariances and correlations and show how such bounds can be tightened using information beyond the …

valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes … on the nature of the private information and the valuation process the distortion might increase or decrease over time. …

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have … access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete … information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes correlated equilibrium. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed …

bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder's information is truncated from below. As the auction ends, the … winning bidder only has limited information, namely that his valuation is sufficiently high to win the auction. The sequential … constraints of the bidders from interim to posterior constraints. Due to the limited disclosure of information, the participation …